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1 Introduction
In pharmaceutical markets new innovations are protected by patents that restrict competing
rms from copying the innovation within a certain period. When the patent expires, competing
rms may enter the market with generic products. The generic versions contain exactly the same
active chemical ingredient and must prove therapeutic equivalence before they can be launched
on the market. Since generics have the same therapeutic e¤ect as the brand-name, one would
expect that only relative prices matter for the consumers (or physicians) choice of drug. Thus,
generic entry should trigger erce price competition between brand-names and generics. This
is, however, not what is observed. A robust empirical regularity is that the brand-names charge
a higher price than their generic versions and obtain signicant market shares (e.g., Scherer,
2000).1 ;2
The high market share of higher priced brand-names in the pharmaceutical o¤-patent market
segment is a policy concern across Western countries. The reasoning is two-fold: rst, innovation
incentives should be taken care of in the patent period, so there is no argument for o¤ering
rents to brand-name producers after patent expiry.3 Second, the generic versions are supposed
to provide exactly the same health benet to consumers as the brand-names, implying that
only relative prices should determine the choice of drug, although consumers might have a
preference for the brand-name.4 Consequently, most Western countries impose regulations to
control prices and expenditures, and to stimulate competition in the pharmaceutical market.5 ;6
1Some studies show that brand-name prices even increase when the patent expires and generics enter the
market (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997). Recent papers by Ching (2010a, 2010b) also
show that brand-name prices increase as the number of generics become higher.
2Brand-name market shares decline after generic entry, but the extent seems to vary across countries, over
time and across molecules (see e.g., Danzon and Chao, 2000).
3This is of course a strong assumption. It is hard for regulators to design a patent protection system that
induces optimal innovation incentives, see e.g., Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), Gallini (2002), Brekke and
Straume (2009). However, it should be more e¢cient to address innovation incentives by rening the on-patent
regulation rather than allowing for substantial rents in the o¤-patent period.
4 If consumers subjectively value brand-names more than generics, high brand-name market shares should not
be a policy problem. However, there are two reasons for regulation: rst, due to insurance, patients do not face
the full cost of choosing a high-priced brand-name instead of a cheaper generic. Second, the choice of drug is
often made by physicians who might be inclined (e.g., due to marketing) to prescribe a brand-name rather than
a generic despite therapeutical equivalence and price di¤erences (see, e.g., Hellerstein, 1998).
5Danzon (1997) provides an excellent overview of theory and practice of price regulation in the pharmaceutical
industry. See also Kanavos (2001) for a comprehensive overview of pharmaceutical regulation practices in 14 EU
countries.
6Even in the US there are some price control mechanisms. For example, (generic) reference pricing is well-
established through the "maximum allowable charge" programs used by Medicaid. The recent extension of
Medicare to prescription drugs has spurred a debate of price controls also in the US (see e.g., Frank and Newhouse,
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However, concerns have also been raised about potential negative e¤ects of regulation. For
example, Danzon and Chao (2000) argue that regulation drives out competition and is thus
counter-productive in obtaining cost-savings.7 In the present study, we argue that it depends
on how you regulate.
In this paper, we study the impact of the two most widely used regulatory regimes  price
cap regulation and reference pricing (RP)  on competition and pharmaceutical expenditures
in the o¤-patent market.8 ;9 Under price cap regulation the regulator curbs market power by
enforcing maximum prices that rms are allowed to charge. RP, on the other hand, denes a
maximum reimbursement that will be covered by the regulator. If consumers demand a product
with a price above the RP, they will have to cover this extra cost out-of-pocket. Our study
consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. The theoretical analysis is based on a vertical
di¤erentiation model, where we analyze price competition between brand-names and generics
under the di¤erent regimes and derive empirically testable predictions. The empirical part of
the paper exploits a unique policy experiment in Norway, where the government exposed a
subsample of the o¤-patent drugs on the market to RP. The policy reform can thus be viewed
as a natural experiment that provides us with a comparison group consisting of o¤-patent drugs
subject to price cap regulation throughout the whole period. We use a rich product level panel
data set covering a four-year period from 2001 to 2005 that gives us variation over time (before
and after the reform) and across products that are subject to di¤erent regulatory regimes (price
cap regulation or RP).
Our paper builds on Brekke et al. (2009) who exploit the same policy experiment. While they
focus solely on the price responses by the pharmaceutical rms to the change in regulation, our
2008)
7They base their conclusion on a cross-national study using data for 1992, showing that price competition
between generic competitors is stronger in unregulated or less regulated markets (United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, and Germany) than in countries with strict price or reimbursement regulations (France, Italy, and Japan).
8Reference pricing (also called internal referencing) refers to a system where the regulator (payer) denes
a maximum reimbursement based on the prices of therapeutically similar or equivalent drugs on the market
(see, e.g., Danzon and Ketcham, 2004). Reference pricing and price cap regulation based on international prices
(external referencing) has become increasingly popular and are now the two main regulatory schemes in Western
countries. See e.g. Kanavos (2001) for a survey of pharmaceutical regulation in Europe.
9Reference pricing (interal referencing) is used by many European countries, but also outside Europe in coun-
tries like New Zealand, Australia, Canada (British Columbia), Brazil, etc. In the US, the "maximum allowable
charge" (MAC) programs used by Medicaid can be classied as reference pricing. See e.g., Danzon and Ketcham
(2004).
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study di¤ers and extends their work along several important dimensions.10 In the theoretical
part we o¤er a much richer and more detailed analysis of RP. A main contribution here is
the distinction between endogenous and exogenous RP, where in the former case the RP is
set as a function of the market prices, so that the rms take into account that their pricing
might also a¤ect the RP. This distinction is important because, as will be shown, exogenous
and endogenous RP have opposite e¤ects on the generic rms pricing incentives. If the RP
is exogenous, generic rms have an incentive to increase their prices, which implies that RP
might be counterproductive with respect to cost savings, as claimed by, for instance, Danzon
and Chao (2000). However, if the RP is endogenous, we show that generic rms have a strategic
incentive to lower their prices to inuence the RP and increase market shares. In this case,
RP would unambiguously result in cost saving. We argue that this new result has a direct
policy implication with respect to the design of the RP system, more specically the frequency
with which the reference price is updated, since long (short) time intervals between each update
of the reference price would correspond more closely to exogenous (endogenous) RP according
to our theoretical model. Finally, our new theoretical result is also important because it is
consistent with, and thus provides an explanation to, several previous empirical ndings on
reference pricing (see e.g. Aronsson et al., 2001, Pavcnik, 2002, Brekke et al., 2009).
In the empirical part, we extend the work by Brekke et al. (2009) along two dimensions. First,
we study the impact of RP on the competition between brand-names and generics, measured by
(brand-name) market shares. The direct e¤ect of RP is to reduce brand-name market shares,
but the following price reductions by the brand-name rms pull in the opposite direction. The
overall e¤ect on competition is therefore a priori ambiguous. By estimating the impact on
brand-name market shares, the Norwegian policy experiment allows us to directly re-examine the
concerns put forward by Danzon and Chao (2000) that regulation might drive out competition
in o¤-patent pharmaceutical markets. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we study welfare
and policy implications by estimating the e¤ect of RP on overall pharmaceutical expenditures
and consumer expenditures (copayments). Galloping pharmaceutical expenditures are a major
policy concern in most developed countries and the main policy objective of RP is to reduce
10Brekke et al. (2009) found that the introduction of reference pricing triggered signicant price reductions on
both brand-names and generics. They also identied a negative cross-price e¤ect on therapeutic substitutes of
the drugs subject to the reform.
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such costs by inducing more generic sales. However, RP might have the (unintended) adverse
e¤ect of simply shifting costs from the payer to the consumers, as they are now exposed to
extra surcharges. It is therefore of great policy interest to examine more carefully not only
the total size of cost savings but also to decompose the cost e¤ect in terms of changes in total
patient expenditures. Thus, in contrast to Brekke et al. (2009), we derive results concerning the
competition between brand-names and generics and, importantly, draw more clear-cut welfare
and policy implications based on the policy experiment.11
Our paper provides two sets of ndings. The rst set is concerned with the market outcomes
of the change in regulation. First, we nd that RP leads to signicant price reductions on
both brand-names (33 percent) and generics (22 percent). This nding runs counter to the
price convergence prediction by Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon and Ketcham (2004), who
argue that while brand-names are likely to reduce their prices, generics will respond to RP by
increasing their prices since demand becomes less price elastic below the RP. As explained above,
we show in the theory section that their argument is correct only if the RP is (perceived to be)
exogenous to the rms pricing decisions. However, under an endogenous RP system the generic
producers have a strategic incentive to lower their prices to reduce the RP and thus make the
brand-name more expensive for the consumers.
This nding is in line with previous empirical studies. Pavcnik (2002) studies the introduction
of (therapeutic) RP in Germany in 1989. Using data for two di¤erent therapeutic elds (oral
antidiabetics and antiulcerants) for 1986 to 1996, she identies signicant price reductions of the
RP system on both brand-names and generics, with the e¤ect being stronger for brand-names.
Similar results are obtained in Brekke et al. (2009), as mentioned above.12 In Norway the
RP was set as a weighted average of brand-name and generic prices and updated every third
month. In fact, most countries use an RP rule that depends on rms pricing.13 Thus, the
robust empirical nding that RP reduces both brand-name and generic prices can be explained
by our theoretical model of an endogenous RP system.
11 In addition, we have extended our data set to cover more o¤-patent molecules than in Brekke et al. (2009),
though excluding the on-patent molecules. We also perform several robustness checks to account for potential
problems related to selection issues, endogeneity and serial correlation.
12Bergman and Rudholm (2003) study the e¤ects of the Swedish RP system on brand-name (not generic) prices.
Distinguishing between actual and potential competition from generics, they nd that RP only reduced prices of
brand-names that actually faced competition from generics rms.
13See, for instance, the survey by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000).
5
Secondly, we nd that RP stimulates competition between brand-names and generic com-
petition by signicantly reducing the brand-names market share (almost 15 percent). The
introduction of RP makes the brand-name more expensive for consumers for given prices, which
suggests a shift in demand towards generics. However, as shown above, the brand-name rms
respond to RP by substantially lowering their prices, which pull in the other direction. In our
theoretical model, we show that the direct demand e¤ect of RP tends to dominate the indirect
price e¤ect, resulting in higher generic market shares. In the empirical part we separate the
two counteracting e¤ects by controlling for relative branded-generic prices. We nd, however,
no signicant impact of changes in relative prices on the brand-name market shares. Thus, the
reduction of almost 15 percent in brand-name market shares is a direct demand response to the
radical change in copayments brought about by the introduction of RP, which by far outweighs
any indirect e¤ects via the price responses.
This part of our analysis is closely related to Aronsson et al. (2001) who use Swedish data to
analyze the impact of relative branded-generic prices and the introduction of RP on brand-name
market shares.14 The e¤ects of both relative prices and RP are weak and often insignicant.
Estimating the impact of RP on the whole sample (12 molecules) provides no signicant e¤ects
on brand-name market shares. They therefore run regressions at molecule level, where they
report signicant, though weak, e¤ects for 5 out of 12 molecules. While the weak e¤ect of
relative prices is in line with our results, this is not the case for RP. However, our study di¤ers
from theirs in important ways. Most importantly, in Sweden the reform was introduced for
all o¤-patent substances, while we have a natural experiment, which improves the scope for
identication. Second, we have a more detailed and extensive data set, covering 24 molecules
with monthly price and volume data.
Our second set of results are concerned with welfare and policy implications. Danzon and
Chao (2000) suggest that average molecule prices (i.e., brand-name and generic prices weighted
by their market shares) are good proxies for changes in pharmaceutical expenditures, since
overall (molecule) demand is quite price inelastic. We rst test this assumption and nd no
signicant di¤erence in volume trends for the drugs subject to the reform compared with the
14Aronsson et al. (2001) interpret relative prices as a measure of competition between brand-names and generics.
This seems highly imprecise since lower relative prices might be due to higher generic prices, which would hardly
be equivalent to stronger competition from generics.
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drugs under PC regulation over the whole period. We then proceed by estimating the e¤ect
of RP on the average molecule prices, nding that the introduction of RP triggers a reduction
of almost 30 percent, which is a substantial cost saving. There are two di¤erent e¤ects that
contribute to these savings: (i) reductions in brand-name and generic drug prices, and (ii) a
shift in demand from brand-names to generics.
Finally, we take a closer look at the consumer welfare since RP o¤ers less insurance coverage
to patients. For given prices and demand, RP implies a shift of medical costs from the payer
(insurer) to the patients, resulting in cost-savings for the payer and a corresponding cost-increase
for the patients. The question is therefore whether the price and market share e¤ects can o¤set
the direct increase in patient copayments due to RP. We demonstrate that not only the generic
but also the brand-name copayments become lower due to price reductions. The price reductions
for brand-names more than o¤set the extra surcharges due to RP. These e¤ects are reinforced
by the fact that RP induces consumers to switch to generics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model and
derive testable predictions for the empirical analysis. In Section 3 we present some institutional
background by describing the price cap regulation and the policy experiment with reference
pricing in Norway. In Section 4 we present our data and some descriptive statistics. In Section 5
we present the empirical method and our basic results with respect to pricing and market share
e¤ects. In Section 6 we perform various robustness checks, where we test the validity of our
control group and account for serial correlation and endogeneity. In Section 7 we discuss welfare
and policy implications by looking at the e¤ects of RP on overall and patient expenditures.
Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 A theoretical model
Consider a therapeutic market with products o¤ered by two rms. Firm B o¤ers the original
(o¤-patent) brand-name drug b, while rm G o¤ers a generic substitute g. Consumers are
heterogeneous with respect to the gross valuation of drug treatment, represented by a parameter
 which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; t]. It would be natural to think of the
heterogeneity of gross valuations as reecting di¤erences in severity levels, but it could also
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be interpreted as di¤erences in prescription practices among physicians.15 The total mass of
consumers is normalized to 1. Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the most
preferred drug. The utility derived from no drug consumption is zero, while a consumer who
buys one unit of drug i obtains a net utility
Ui =
8><
>:
   cb if i = b
   cg if i = g
; (1)
where  > 1 is the (perceived) quality di¤erence  e.g., due to di¤erences in advertising intensity
 between the brand-name and the generic drug, and ci is the patient copayment for drug i.
16
A consumer with a positive net utility of drug consumption will choose the most preferred
drug version by trading o¤ drug quality against drug copayment. The higher the gross valuation
of drug treatment, the more the consumer is willing to pay in order to purchase the (high-
quality) brand-name drug. A consumer who is indi¤erent between the two drug versions has a
gross valuation equal to b , given by b   cb = b   cg; yielding
b = cb   cg
   1
: (2)
Consumers with a gross valuation higher than b demand the brand-name drug, while the re-
maining consumers demand the generic drug, as long as the net utility of drug consumption is
non-negative. Total demand for the two drug versions are thus given by
Db =
8>>>><
>>>>:
0 if cb   cg  t (   1)
1
t
(t  b) if 0 < cb   cg < t (   1)
1 if cb  cg
; (3)
15For example, pharmaceutical detailing might inuence a physicians willingness to prescribe a cheaper generic
substitute.
16As mentioned in the Introduction, there is strong empirical evidence that generic drugs are not perceived
to be perfect substitutes to the original brand-name drug, despite being chemically identical. The ndings of
substantial and persistent branded-generic price di¤erences after generic entry (see, e.g., Grabowski and Vernon,
1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997, Scott Morton, 2000, Ching 2010a, 2010b) t well with predictions of vertical
di¤erentiation models. Two recent papers applying this approach to competition between brand-names and
generics are Königbauer (2007) and Brekke et al. (2007).
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Dg =
8>>>><
>>>>:
1 if cb   cg  t (   1)
1
t
(b   cg) if 0 < cb   cg < t (   1)
0 if cb  cg
: (4)
In the following we focus on the intermediate case, where both drug versions have positive
demand in equilibrium. From the above demand functions we can dene the market share of
the generic drug,
g :=
Dg
Db +Dg
: (5)
Assuming that marginal production costs of both drug versions are constant and equal to w,
prots are given by
i = (pi   w)Di; (6)
where pi is the price of drug i; i = b; g. Given the restrictions imposed by the regulatory regime
in place, we assume that the two rms play a Bertrand game, simultaneously choosing drug
prices to maximize prots.
2.1 No regulation
As a benchmark for comparison, consider the case of no regulation, where rms are free to
choose drug prices and patient copayment is given by
ci = f + pi; (7)
where f > 0 is a xed fee and  2 (0; 1) is the coinsurance rate.17 To make sure that both rms
are active in equilibrium, we impose the condition f + w < t2 .
The rst-order conditions for prot maximizing drug prices yield the following best-response
functions for the producers of the brand-name and generic drug, respectively:
pb (pg) =
1
2

pg + w +
t (   1)


; (8)
17A copayment system with a xed and a variable component is common for many countries (see, e.g., Kanavos,
2001). Notice, however, that the parameters  and f can be given several alternative interpretations. For example,
 could be interpreted as the prescribing physicians price consciousness (see, e.g., Hellerstein, 1998), while f can
be interpreted also as the (non-monetary) cost of attending a GP to obtain a prescription.
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pg (pb) =
1
2

pb + w  
f (   1)


: (9)
The best-response functions conrm that drug prices are strategic complements; a higher brand-
name drug price induces a higher generic drug price, and vice versa.
Under free pricing, equilibrium drug prices are found by simultaneously solving (8)-(9),
yielding
pg =
(   1) (t  2f) + (2 + 1)w
 (4   1)
; (10)
pb =
(   1) (2t   f) + 3w
 (4   1)
: (11)
Since the brand-name drug is perceived to be of higher quality than the generic drug, rm
B will set the higher price, pb > p

g, and serve the consumers with higher gross valuation of
drug treatment. The larger the degree of perceived vertical di¤erentiation, , the larger the
branded-generic price di¤erence in equilibrium.
2.2 Price cap regulation
The equilibrium outcome under price cap regulation is a straightforward modication of the
free pricing equilibrium derived above. If the producer of the brand-name drug faces a binding
price cap, pb, set by a regulator, the equilibrium generic drug price is given by (9), with pb = pb .
Stricter price regulation makes the brand-name drug less expensive for consumers, inducing  all
else equal  a shift in demand towards drug b. However, since prices are strategic complements,
rm G will respond by lowering the price of the generic drug. An assessment of the total e¤ect
shows that the former (direct) e¤ect dominates the latter (indirect) e¤ect:
@g
@pb
=
22 (t  f   w)
(   1) ( (2t  w)  f ( + 1)  pb)
2 > 0: (12)
Proposition 1 Under price cap regulation, a reduction in the (binding) price cap reduces the
equilibrium market share of generics.
In other words, stricter price cap regulation dampens generic competition. If price cap
regulation is su¢ciently strict, generic competition will be completely eliminated. The critical
price cap, below which the generic producer will exit the market, is given by pb =
f( 1)

+ w.
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We see that the likelihood of price cap regulation driving out generic competition is increasing
in the degree of perceived vertical di¤erentiation and the xed cost of drug consumption, while
decreasing in the degree of coinsurance.
2.3 Reference pricing
Under a reference pricing (RP) system, rms are free to set drug prices, but patient copayment
is based on a RP, r, that is set by a regulator.18 More specically, if a consumer chooses a drug
that is priced higher than the RP, she has to pay the full di¤erence between the RP and the
actual drug price. Usually, the RP is set at a level somewhere between the lowest and highest
drug price in the market. For a RP r 2 (pg; pb), the copayment schedule is given by
ci =
8><
>:
r + (pb   r) + f if i = b
pg + f if i = g
: (13)
In order to illustrate the decomposed e¤ects of RP on drug pricing and generic competition, we
will do the analysis in two steps: First, we consider the case where r is exogenous to the rmss
pricing decisions, which we dub Exogenous RP. Subsequently, we endogenize r and make it a
function of the prices set by the rms in the market. This scenario is dubbed Endogenous RP.
2.3.1 Exogenous RP
Assume that the rms perceive the RP to be exogenously given. For r 2 (pg; pb), equilibrium
prices are then given by
prpg (r) =
(   1) (t  2f) + (2+ 1)w   r (1  )
 (4   1)
; (14)
prpb (r) =
(   1) (2t   f) +  (2 + )w + r (2   1) (1  )
4   1
: (15)
We can analyze the e¤ects of RP by considering a marginal reduction in r. RP implies that the
brand-name drug becomes relatively more expensive, and that drug demand becomes more
18Reference pricing is somewhat analogous to the model of yardstick competition by Shleifer (1985). However,
there are several di¤erences. First, the reference price is based on market prices rather than reported costs.
Second, yardstick competition focuses on inducing cost reducing e¤ort, while reference pricing aims are reducing
prices. Finally, costs are not observable to regulators, while prices are.
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elastic for prices above r. The resulting price responses are easily derived from (14)-(15):
@prpg =@r < 0 and @p
rp
b =@r > 0.
Proposition 2 Under exogenous reference pricing, a reduction in the RP leads to a reduction
(increase) in the brand-name (generic) drug price.
This result is in line with the price convergence hypothesis19: The introduction of reference
pricing leads to a price convergence towards the RP; the generic drug becomes more expensive,
while the brand-name drug becomes cheaper. In the case of no coinsurance, there is no incentive
for the generic rm to cut price below the RP. However, the price convergence hypothesis ignores
the fact that, in most reference pricing systems, the RP is determined as a function of actual
drug prices and is thus endogenous. If the RP is frequently updated, the drug producers know
that their price setting is going to a¤ect the RP, and thereby demand and prots, in the future.
2.3.2 Endogenous RP
Assume that the RP is a weighted average of the brand-name and generic drug prices:
r = pg + (1  ) pb: (16)
When the rms are able to inuence the RP through their price setting, a new and counteracting
incentive for the generic producer is introduced. As before, reference pricing makes the brand-
name drug more expensive, giving the generic producer an incentive to raise prices. However,
the generic producer can make the brand-name drug even more expensive by lowering the price
of the generic drug, since this automatically reduces the RP. Equilibrium prices are now given
by
prpg =
(   1) (t  2f) + ( (2 + 1) + 3 (1  ))w
3 (1  ) +  (4   1)
; (17)
prpb =
(   1) ( (2t   f) +  (1  ) (2t  f)) + 3 ( (1  ) + ) ( (1  ) + )w
(+  (1  )) (3 (1  ) +  (4   1))
: (18)
We can analyze the e¤ects of reference pricing by considering a marginal increase in . The
19See, e.g., Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon and Ketcham (2004).
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equilibrium price responses of RP are given by
@prpg
@
=  
3 (   1) (1  ) (t  2 (f + w))
( (4   1) + 3 (1  ))2
< 0; (19)
@prpb
@
=  
(   1) (1  ) [2t
  3 (f + w)]
 ( (4   1) + 3 (1  ))2
< 0; (20)
where

 := 2 + 32 (1  )2 + 22 (2   1) + 6 (1  ) ;
 := (+  (1  ))2 < 
:
Thus, endogenizing the RP completely reverses the price response of the generic producer,
implying that RP leads to price reductions for brand-name and generic drugs. Notably, this
result holds also in the case of no coinsurance ( = 0), as the RP is a¤ected by generic price
reductions. Since both drugs become cheaper, the e¤ect of RP on relative prices is a priori
uncertain. Equilibrium relative prices, dened as !rp := prpb =p
rp
g , are given by
!rp =
(   1) ( (1  ) (2t  f) +  (2t   f)) + 3 (+  (1  )) ( (1  ) + )w
( (1  ) + ) ((   1) (t  2f) + ( (2 + 1) + 3 (1  ))w)
: (21)
It is straightforward to verify that, in our parameterized model, @!
rp
@
< 0, implying that the
price reduction is stronger, in absolute terms, for the brand-name drug.
What is the e¤ect of RP on the competition between brand-names and generics, measured by
the generic market share? The above analysis suggests that there are two counteracting forces:
(i) For given relative drug prices, RP generally leads to an increase in the relative copayment
rate, which is given by
 (pb; pg) :=
cb (pb; pg)
cg (pb; pg)
=
f + pb +  (pb   pg) (1  )
f + pg
: (22)
The e¤ect of RP is then given by
@ (pb; pg)
@
=
(pb   pg) (1  )
f + pg
> 0: (23)
The strength of this e¤ect is decreasing in both f and . Indeed, in the absence of insurance,
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i.e.,  ! 1, there is obviously no e¤ect of RP on relative copayments. Generally, though, as
long as  < 1, RP induces a shift in consumption  for given drug prices  from brand-name to
generic drugs.
(ii) The positive relationship between RP and relative copayments might be, at least partly,
compensated for by a reduction in relative drug prices, i.e., @!
rp
@
< 0, as shown above. All else
equal, this e¤ects leads to a shift of consumption from generic to brand-name drugs. The overall
e¤ect on market shares is thus a priori ambiguous.
Combining the two above mentioned e¤ects, the overall impact of RP on competition between
brand-names and their generic counterparts is
@rpg
@
=
(f + w) (   1) (1  ) (t  2 (f + w))
(3 (t    (1  )w)   (2 + 1) (f + w) + 3 (1  ) (t  f))2
> 0: (24)
Thus, the increase in the relative copayment rate is not outweighed by the drop in relative drug
prices, implying that RP leads to an increase in the generic market share. It is also possible to
conrm that the positive e¤ect of RP on generic market shares is weaker the higher the degree of
coinsurance, i.e., @2rpg =@@ < 0. This is quite intuitive, since reference pricing has a smaller
impact on relative copayments for higher levels of . In the extreme case of  = 1, where
patients pay the full drug price out-of-pocket, a reference pricing system is de facto irrelevant.
Proposition 3 Assume that the RP is endogenously determined as a function of the drug prices
in the market. A higher weight attached to the low-priced generic drug, implying all else equal
a reduction in the RP, will then lead to (i) a reduction in both brand-name and generic drug
prices and (ii) an increase in the market share of generic drugs.
2.4 Discussion and theoretical predictions
In our theoretical analysis, we have made the important distinction between exogenous and
endogenous RP. In the Norwegian experiment, the RP was dened as a sales-weighted average
of the drug prices within each therapeutical class and updated every 3 months. This suggests
that endogenous RP  which predicts lower prices for both brand-names and generics in response
to RP  is the most appropriate choice of model. Furthermore, notice that endogenizing the
weights ( in our model) by market shares only reinforces our previously derived e¤ects. To see
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this, observe that a reduction in pg reduces r for a given value of . All else equal, this shifts
demand towards the generic drug. If  is endogenized by the generic market share, this will
then lead to a further reduction in r, reinforcing the generic rms incentive to reduce prices as
a response to RP.
When assessing the e¤ect of RP on competition between brand-names and generics, we
have, by considering marginal changes in , implicitly compared the outcome with the free
pricing equilibrium, since this equilibrium coincides with the RP equilibrium in the limit  ! 0.
However, notice that, since a binding price cap reduces generic competition (compared with free
pricing), the positive e¤ect of RP on generic market shares would be even larger if we compared
with a price cap equilibrium. The drug pricing responses of replacing price cap regulation with
RP are less clear, and depends on the strictness of price cap regulation. If the price cap is
su¢ciently low, we cannot rule out the possibility that replacing this regulatory system with RP
will increase drug prices. However, the fact that we observe generic competition in markets with
price cap regulation suggests that, in reality, the price cap is generally set well above marginal
production costs. Furthermore, the descriptive data from the policy experiment we exploit in
the subsequent empirical analysis does not suggest that this is a relevant case.
In our theoretical model, we have also made the simplifying assumption that there is only
one generic competitor to the brand-name drug. How is the presence of more than one generic
competitor likely to a¤ect the results derived from the basic model? If generic drugs are perfect
substitutes in demand, it only takes two generic drug producers to induce marginal cost pricing
for generics. Since drug prices are strategic complements (cf. (8) and (9)), it is straightforward
to show that this would reduce the equilibrium price of the brand-name drug in our model.
Thus, more generic competitors should intuitively lead to lower drug prices. Of course, marginal
cost pricing of generics with two or more generic competitors is a somewhat extreme case.
In reality, there are likely to be demand frictions that will lead to drug prices in excess of
marginal production costs also for generics, even if a higher number of generic competitors has
a dampening e¤ect on drug prices.20
One limitation of our model is that it does not take into account the slow di¤usion of generics.
20Such frictions could be due to imperfect information, exclusive dealing of generics or imperfect agency between
prescribing physicians and patients.
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Ching (2010a, 2010b) o¤ers a model where consumers learn the generic product quality and di¤er
in their price sensitivity, showing that generics would enter the market slowly, gradually captur-
ing price sensitive consumers. Consequently, brand-names respond by increasing their prices as
more generics enter the market. He also shows that such a model is consistent with data using
a structural estimation approach. Also in our model there is an incentive for the brand-name
rm to increase its price when generic rms capture the price sensitive consumers. However,
the strategic e¤ect of competition from generics always dominates the consumer selection e¤ect
(i.e., the marginal consumer becomes less price sensitive).
Moreover, we would like to mention that the market size of a given molecule would a¤ect the
number of generic entrants and thus the degree of price competition (at least among the generic
rms). As shown by Saha et al. (2006), brand-name drugs with a large market size prior to
generic entry (blockbuster drugs) experience signicantly more generic entrants, price erosion
and generic penetration than other drugs. However, our focus is on the e¤ect of RP rather
than determinants of generic entry and competition. As our theoretical model demonstrates,
the e¤ects of RP on drug prices and market shares go mainly through the change in relative
copayment rates between brand-name and generics and should therefore not depend qualitatively
on the number of generics. In any case, we will account for generic competition in the empirical
section.
Based on the above theoretical analysis and discussion, we postulate the following hypotheses
for the empirical analysis: Switching from price cap regulation to reference pricing leads to
(i) a reduction in brand-name and generic prices (given that price cap regulation is not exces-
sively strict),
(ii) and an increase (decrease) in generic (brand-name) market shares.
3 Institutional background
The Norwegian pharmaceutical market is, as most other Western pharmaceutical markets, ex-
tensively regulated. The regulatory body is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services
and its agency called the Norwegian Medicines Agency. Norway has adopted the European
patent law system to a large extent, implying that all new chemical entities are subject to
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patent protection for a given period. To launch their products on the Norwegian market, phar-
maceutical rms need a government approval. The approval is based on (clinical) evidence
showing that the drug is not dangerous and has a positive health e¤ect. To get the drug listed
for reimbursement ("blue list"), the pharmaceutical rms must in addition provide evidence of
a positive cost-benet analysis.
All prescription drugs (reimbursable or not) are subject to price control. The current system
introduced in 2000 is a price cap scheme based on international reference pricing, also called
external referencing. This scheme has become widely used across countries.21 This system
covers all prescription drugs, both on-patent and o¤-patent, except for those included in the RP
system. Under price cap regulation, producers have to report foreign prices in a dened set of
"comparable" countries.22 The price cap, which is the maximum domestic price a producer can
charge for its product, is then set equal to the average of the three lowest reported foreign prices
of this drug. Generic versions get the same price cap as the brand-names, but the price cap
rarely binds as they are typically priced lower than the brand-name. The price cap is imposed
at the wholesale level. The government then denes the maximum mark-up the pharmacies can
charge, which in turn determines the price cap at the retail level for each product.
The RP system, called "index pricing", was introduced in March 2003 for a subsample of
o¤-patent pharmaceuticals facing generic competition. Initially, the index price system covered
six chemical substances: Citalopram (depression), Omeprazol (antiulcer), Cetirizin (allergy),
Loratadin (allergy), Enalapril (high blood pressure) and Lisinopril (high blood pressure). The
system was later extended with two additional substances; Simvastatin (high cholesterol) and
Amlodipin (high blood pressure). The choice of drugs were based on two criteria: rst, they
should cover a wide set of diseases and not be concentrated within one particular disease type;
second, the selected drugs should be high-volume drugs.23
21Price cap regulation based on international price comparisons is widely used in Europe, see Kanavos (2001),
but also outside Europe (e.g., Brazil, Canada, Japan, Korea, Taiwan).
22The Norwegian basket of "comparable" countries consists of Austria, Belgium, Danmark, Finland, Germany,
Irland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Southern and Eastern European countries, as well as France and
Switzerland, are excluded. If the product is not yet launched in any of the countries in the basket, the price cap
will be determined by negotiations between the producer and the regulator.
23The rst criterion is helpful for identication purposes since it provides us with a proper control group. The
second criterion could potentially be a problem if the selected drugs di¤er from the non-selected drugs. In Section
6, we therefore perform a pre-reform test, showing no signicant di¤erences in prices and market shares for the
treatment (reference priced drugs) and the control (price capped drugs) group.
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In calculating the index (reference) price, the regulator rst clustered drugs with the same
chemical substance. Within each substance group, drugs were classied into subgroups depend-
ing on package size and dosage in order to adjust for cost variation. The regulator then calculated
the index price, dened as the sales weighted average of brand-name and generic prices, for each
subgroup. For the six chemical substances initially included, there were 16 index prices in total.
The regulator repeated this exercise every three months, resulting in a revised index price for
every quarter of a year. Thus, if generics increase their market share and/or there is a reduction
in brand-name or generic prices, this would induce a lower index price for the next period. In
other words, the index price system can be classied as an endogenous RP system, as explained
in Section 2.24
The index price system also provided incentives for generic substitution at pharmacy level.
The pharmacies obtained the positive margin of selling a (generic) drug priced lower than the
RP. However, they also faced the negative margin of selling a (brand-name) drug priced higher
than the RP. Thus, we expect that the pharmacies would always suggest a generic substitute
to patients, except for the case when the physician had made a reservation against generic
substitution on the prescription.25
Patients in Norway are required to pay coinsurance for all reimbursable prescription drugs.
The coinsurance rate is 36 percent of the price of the drug. However, for the drugs included in
the RP system, patients had, in addition, to pay the full price di¤erence between the RP and
the high-priced brand-name, if they refused generic substitution. There are patient expenditure
caps, which for the period of our study were 400 NOK per script and 1,350 NOK per year.
However, these caps did not apply to the extra copayment under reference pricing if the patient
refused generic substitution. Thus, consumers had to fully cover the price di¤erence between
the brand-name and the RP even if they were already at the expenditure cap level.
The RP system in Norway was modied in 2005. Under the new regime (called "Trinnpris"),
the RP is set as a discount on the brand-name price and comes into e¤ect once generics enter
24The initial reference price was based on drug prices that were set before the introduction of the RP system
was announced. Thus, it was in principle not possible for the drug producers to game the regulator by increasing
prices in the period before RP was introduced (see Miraldo, 2009).
25The RP reform in Norway did not include incentives on the physician-side. Physicians were as usual en-
couraged to prescribe cheaper generics when possible, but there were no nancial incentives like in, for instance,
Germany (physician budgets).
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after patent expiration. The argument for this regime is that it involves less administrative costs
than the previous one, where the RP is set as the average price of brand-name and generics and
calculated every quarter.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
In the empirical analysis we use data from Farmastat.26 Their database includes information on
sales value and volume for each package of drugs sold at the Norwegian pharmaceutical market.
Values are in pharmacy purchase prices and volumes in dened daily doses (DDD) for the active
substance according to the ATC-code system.27 The database also provides detailed information
about product name, manufacturer, launch date, package size, dosage, etc.
From this database we have information on all o¤-patent prescription drugs within the 40
largest ATC groups (in terms of sales volume) over a four year period from 1st of January 2001
to 31st of December 2004. All drugs in our sample are on the governments reimbursement list.
Our empirical strategy relies on a comparison of drugs subject to RP with drugs under price
cap regulation. Since most of the brand-name drugs in the index price system faced competition
from generics for a relatively short period before they came subject to the reform, we only
include molecules with generic entry after 1st of January 1998 in our sample. This leaves us
with 24 ATC groups. Table 1 lists the main characteristics of these molecules:
[ Table 1 about here ]
The table rst provides information about our dependent variables, i.e., average prices of
brand-names and generics and brand-name market shares. The average brand-name and generic
prices are in DDD. Brand-name market share is the proportion of sales of brand-names compared
to sales of generics within each ATC group. All prices are deated using the consumer price
index.
The table also provides information about our main explanatory variables. First, we list the
26Farmastat is a company specialised in provision of pharmaceutical statistics. The company is owned by the
Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.
27The ATC-code system is used by the World Health Organization to classify pharmaceutical substances accord-
ing to their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Pharmaceuticals sharing the same seven-digit
(ve-level) ATC-code have the same ingredients and are considered equivalent in the treatment of a given disease.
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average number of generic competitors within each of the 24 substances. From our theoretical
discussion, we expect this to have a negative impact on brand-name and generic prices, as well
as on brand-name market shares. Second, we have a variable capturing the degree of therapeutic
competition, which is measured by the number of ATC groups having the same three rst digits
in their ATC code. We expect that more therapeutic competitors also contributes to lower
brand-name and/or generic prices. This is in line with Ellison et al. (1998) and Brekke et
al. (2009) who report negative cross-price elasticities for therapeutic substitutes. Brekke et al.
(2007) provide a theoretical foundation.
In explaining market shares, we also control for relative brand-name and generic prices.
This enables us to decompose the direct demand e¤ect of RP due to the changes in copayment
structure from the indirect demand e¤ect due to price responses by the rms. The "Relative
price" variable is calculated as brand-name prices divided by the quantity weighted average of
generic drug prices for each substance. In the analysis we divide time into one month periods.
Substances where brand-names face competition from generics over the total sample period are
therefore represented with 48 observations in the data set. Finally, there is a column indicating
whether or not the substance is exposed to RP.28
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to test the hypotheses derived in Section 2.
Our rst hypothesis postulates that (given that the price cap is not excessively strict) a switch
from PC regulation to (endogenous) RP leads to a price reduction for both brand-names and
generics. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 support our rst hypothesis. Prices of brand-
names subject to RP are reduced by almost 23 percent after the reform, while the reduction is
only 8.5 percent for the brand-names under price cap regulation over the same period. Moreover,
generics subject to the reform face a price reduction of almost 13 percent, while there is no price
change for generics under price cap regulation for the whole period.
[ Table 2 about here ]
Our second hypothesis postulates that a switch from price cap regulation to RP should reduce
28Notice that the ATC groups C10AA01 (Simvastatin) and C08CA01 (Amlodipin) were included in the reference
price system in June and September 2004, respectively, while the rest of the ATC groups subject to reference
pricing were included when the reform was initiated in March 2003.
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(increase) brand-name (generic) market shares. In Table 2 we compare (average) brand-name
market shares before and after the RP reform with (average) market shares for brand-names
under price cap regulation over the same period. From the table we see that while there has been
a decrease in brand-name market shares for both groups, the decrease is substantially larger for
the drugs subject to RP.
To study the e¤ect of RP in more detail, we construct graphs of the price and market share
development over time. Figure 1 covers the drugs that become subject to RP during our period,
while Figure 2 covers the drugs in the control group.29
[ Figure 1-2 about here ]
From the gures we see that the development of brand-name and generic average prices and
market shares are fairly similar prior to the policy change. However, when RP is introduced
(given by the vertical line) we see a profound change in the price pattern and the brand-name
market shares for the drugs subject to RP (Figure 1), whereas the residual drugs seem to be
una¤ected (Figure 2).
5 Empirical method and results
In this section we analyze the impact of RP on average brand-name and generic prices and brand-
name market shares. Our estimating strategy relies on a comparison of the molecules a¤ected by
RP (treatment group) to similar molecules under price cap regulation (control group). Having
panel data, we are able to compare inter-temporal variation in outcomes before and after the
imposition of the reform. Therefore, identication relies not only on before-after comparison,
but also on comparison of variations in outcomes for molecules subject to RP with variation in
outcomes for molecules not subject to this reform.
In the analyses, we estimate di¤erent versions of the following xed e¤ect model:
Yit = X
0
it + ai + t + Dit + "it; (25)
29The large shifts in the price and market share graphs are due to new products entering (or old products
exiting) the market. Figure A1 and A2 in the Appendix plot the same variables, but only with drugs that are
present in all periods.
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where Yit is one of the two outcomes described above for molecule i at time t, ai is a molecule
xed e¤ect, t is a period specic e¤ect common to all molecules, "it represents unobserved
time varying factors that a¤ect outcomes, X0it contains observable variables (the number generic
competitors and the number of therapeutic competitors), andDit is a variable indicating whether
or not molecule i is subject to RP at time t. The e¤ect of introducing RP is captured by  and
the e¤ect of the control variables is measured by the vector .
5.1 Brand-name and generic prices
We start out with presenting the basic results from the regression models specied in (25).
First, we analyze the e¤ect of RP on average brand-name and generic prices by estimating the
following xed e¤ect model:
lnPit = X
0
it + ai + t + 1Dit + 2Dit Bi + "it; (26)
where lnPit is the natural logarithm of average brand-name and generic prices.
30 By including
an interaction term (Dit Bi) between the RP indicator (Dit) and the brand-name indicator
(Bi), we can separate the e¤ect of RP on brand-names from the price e¤ect on generics. The
results from the regression are reported in Model 1 in Table 3.
[ Table 3 about here ]
We nd that RP leads to a signicant reduction in both brand-name and generic average
prices, with the e¤ect being stronger for brand-names (33 percent) than for generics (22 percent).
Thus, the claim by Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon and Ketcham (2004) that RP results
in higher generic prices is not supported. The nding is, however, in line with our theoretical
prediction (Hypothesis 1), as well as previous empirical ndings by Pavcnik (2002) and Brekke
et al. (2009).
From Model 1 we also see that the number of generic competitors has a positive e¤ect on
average prices. There are two potential explanations to this relationship. First, the positive e¤ect
could be due to endogeneity problems; i.e., high priced brand-names might attract more generic
30Thus, we have two price observations per molecule per time period.
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entry. Notice that all drugs in our sample have by denition at least one generic competitor,
which means that we measure the e¤ect of the intensity, not the existence, of competition
between brand-names and generics.31 Second, the positive e¤ect could be due to consumer
learning and heterogeneity in price sensitivity, as pointed out by Ching (2010a, 2010b). He
shows that generics slowly enter the market and gradually capture price sensitive consumers,
which induces brand-names to raise their prices.
When estimating the e¤ect of the reform, we pool the average brand-name and generic prices.
If these prices behave very di¤erently  as suggested by empirical studies from the US or Canada
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997, Ching, 2010a)  our specication might
be too restrictive. However, as shown in Figure 1, the average brand-name prices seem to follow
the same pattern as the average generic prices. To check this more thoroughly, we use a SUR
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) model, where we estimate two separate regressions; one for
the average brand-name prices and one for the average generic prices. The results, which are
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix, show that the e¤ect of the reform on average prices are
almost identical to the ones reported in Table 3.
Another potential problem is that the drugs subject to RP are typically high volume drugs
with large market size, which might attract more generic competition than lower volume drugs.
For instance, Saha et al. (2006) show that blockbusters experience more generic entrants, price
reductions and generic penetration than other drugs. Since generic rms enter the market fairly
slowly, we might not capture the e¤ect of the reform, but rather the e¤ect of market size and
the following generic competition. However, the product xed e¤ects in our regressions account
for market size (prior to generic entry), since this is a fairly time-constant (unobserved) product
characteristics. Moreover, we also control for the number of generics, which accounts for the
fact that high-volume brand-names (blockbusters) face stronger competition from generics than
lower volume drugs.
However, one might argue that the price e¤ects we estimate for the high volume drugs subject
to RP would be lower for lower volume drugs because of less generic competition. Clearly, for
some lower volume drugs, generic rms would not nd it protable to enter, which means that
31Bergman and Rudholm (2003) consider a sample of o¤-patent molecules with and without generic competition,
and nd that the existence rather than the intensity of generic competition has an e¤ect on brand-name prices.
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RP would have no e¤ect. For instance, Bergman and Rudholm (2003) show that RP had e¤ects
on brand-name prices only for substances facing actual (not potential) generic competition. On
the other hand, our estimates on the e¤ects of RP are obtained by controlling for the number
of generics, as well as unobserved (time-constant) product characteristics, like market size. In
section 6, we will account for endogeneity issues in various ways.
5.2 Competition between brand-names and generics
The e¤ect of RP on the competition between brand-names and their generic counterparts is not
a priori evident, as pointed out in Section 2. RP changes the copayment structure, making
the brand-name drug relatively more expensive than the generics, which increases the generics
market share (for given prices). However, the brand-names respond to RP by lowering their
prices in order to retain their market shares. The net e¤ect on market shares is thus determined
by the relative strength of these two counteracting e¤ects.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the brand-names market shares (as a percentage).
This measure of competition between brand-names and generics has been used in previous work,
for instance, Aronsson et al. (2001). In the regressions we control for molecule and period specic
e¤ects, as well as the number of generic and therapeutic competitors, and relative prices. The
results are presented in Model 2 in Table 3 above.
We nd that the imposition of RP leads to a signicant (14:7 percent) reduction in brand-
name market shares. Since we control for relative prices in the regression, we can interpret this
decrease as a direct demand response to RP and the corresponding change in the copayment
structure. Relative prices are, however, likely to be endogenous. While relative branded-generic
prices might explain market shares, market shares might also inuence rms price setting and
thus relative prices. We return to this issue in Section 6.
We also nd, as expected, a negative e¤ect of the number of generics on the brand-name
market shares. The number of therapeutic competitors, on the other hand, have a positive e¤ect
on brand-name market shares. This could be explained by the fact that stronger therapeutic
competition might lead to a price reduction for brand-name drugs, which in turn increases their
market share.
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6 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our ndings in the previous section, we conduct a number of tests.
First, we check the validity of our comparison group (consisting of o¤-patent drugs subject
to price cap regulation throughout the whole period). Second, we account for potential serial
correlation in the errors. Finally, we address the possibility that endogeneity might bias our
results.
6.1 Pre-reform tests
An important assumption in the analyses in Section 5 is that the error term "it is uncorrelated
with the reform dummy variable Dit (as well as with X
0
it and t). This implies that, after
controlling for covariates and molecule specic e¤ects in the pre-reform period, the trends in the
dependent variables for drugs subject to RP should not di¤er from trends for drugs subject to
price cap regulation. A test of this assumption is presented in Table 4.
[ Table 4 about here ]
Here we only use observations prior to the RP reform. In order to compare the pre-reform
trends in prices and market shares for drugs in the treatment and control group, we include
interactions between the period dummies and a variable indicating treated molecules (in the
post-reform period). If the interactions are insignicant, this is an indication of a legitimate
control group, i.e., that unobservable factors a¤ecting prices and market shares are uncorrelated
with the probability that a given molecule is in the treatment group. As evident from Table 4,
all interactions are statistically insignicant in both models. In addition, F-tests suggest that
the interactions are jointly insignicant. These results indicate that average brand-name and
generic prices and brand-name market shares for drugs in the two di¤erent groups are following
the same general trend before the RP reform was implemented. We therefore conclude that the
comparison group is legitimate.
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6.2 Accounting for serial correlation
Even though our comparison group is legitimate, several recent papers have pointed out that
standard errors in di¤erences-in-di¤erences regressions are often inconsistent (e.g., Wooldridge,
2002; Bertrand et al., 2004). In the case of positive serial correlation, standard errors may be
biased downward, leading to overestimation of t-statistics and signicance levels. To overcome
the potential problem with serial correlation, we follow the solution proposed in Bertrand et
al. (2004). Using Monte Carlo simulations, they show that collapsing the data into pre- and
post-periods produces consistent standard errors even when the number of observations is small.
In Table 5 we give the results on our three di¤erent outcomes when we ignore the time series
information:
[ Table 5 about here ]
Despite the substantial reduction in the number of observations32, we nd signicant e¤ects
on average brand-name and generic prices (Model 1), as well as on brand-name market shares
(Model 2). As expected, the standard errors are larger than those reported in Table 3, while
the estimated e¤ects of RP are about the same magnitude. We also see from Model 1 that
brand-names do not have a signicantly stronger price reduction than generics. However, the
results also suggest that the strong signicant e¤ects of RP on average brand-name and generic
prices, brand-name market shares and average molecule prices are not driven by biased standard
errors.
6.3 Accounting for endogeneity
In our basic regression models in Section 5 the number of generics and relative prices are likely
to be endogenous. For instance, high prices might attract more generics, while more generics
might result in lower prices. This endogeneity problem can be the explanation for the positive
e¤ect of the number of generics on average prices.
In this section we allow for endogenous explanatory variables by a GMM-IV estimator33 that
is robust to, and e¢cient in the presence of, arbitrary serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
32The reason for why the number of observations is only 44 (and not 48) is that four of the molecules (two of
them subject to reference pricing) do not have generic competition prior to the reform. Excluding these molecules
from the sample do not qualitatively a¤ect the results.
33 IV models were estimated using the Stata module xtivreg2 (Scha¤er, 2007).
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(see Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman, 2007). The long-run heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent covariance matrix is generated using the Bartlett kernel function with a bandwidth
of 12.34 Orthogonality of the instruments is tested by Hansens J statistic, which is consistent
in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (the null hypothesis is that the instru-
ments are uncorrelated with the error term). However, instrument exogeneity is only one of the
two criteria necessary for instruments to be valid. If the instruments are uncorrelated, or only
weakly correlated, with the endogenous variables, then sampling distributions of the IV statistics
are in general non-normal, and standard IV estimates, hypothesis tests, and condence intervals
are unreliable. Hence, tests for underidentication and weak identication are reported. The
underidentication test is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test of whether the excluded instruments
are correlated with the endogenous regressors (the null hypothesis is that the equation is un-
deridentied). The weak instrument test statistic is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic.
As a rule of thumb this F -statistic should be at least 10 for weak identication not to be
considered a problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
As instruments we use rst to third lag of the endogenous variables. In addition we also use
rst to third lag of the number of generics in Sweden as instruments. It is reasonable to assume
that the number generics in Sweden are correlated with the number of generics in Norway, but
not directly correlated with average prices and brand name market shares.
The results from the GMM-IV models are reported in Table 6.35 We rst notice that the
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term) for both models, suggesting that the set of
instruments is appropriate. Considering the underidentication test, the null (i.e., the equation is
underidentied) is rejected for all models, which implies that the models are identied. The weak
identication tests suggest that the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous
variables is su¢ciently strong for both Model 1 and 2.
[ Table 6 about here ]
34According to Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman (2007), a common choice of bandwidth for these kernels is a value
related to the periodicity of the data (4 for quarterly, 12 for monthly, etc.). Since we have monthly data, we
choose a bandwidth of 12.
35First step results are available upon request.
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Focusing rst on the e¤ect of RP, the results from the GMM-IV estimators are consistent
with the results in Section 6.2. We nd that RP signicantly reduces brand-name and generic
prices, as well as brand-name market shares. Moreover, we also see that RP does not have a
signicantly stronger impact on brand-name prices than generic prices (Model 1).
From Table 6 we further see that the number of generics now has a negative, but insignicant
e¤ect on average prices. Thus, the counterintuitive e¤ect obtained in the static model is no
longer present when we control for endogeneity. We also nd that the number of generics has
an insignicant, but negative, e¤ect on brand-name market shares. The e¤ects of the number of
therapeutic competitors and relative prices are consistent with the results reported in Section 5.
7 Welfare and Policy Implications
A full welfare analysis would require information on patients health conditions, as well as rms
innovation and launching incentives, which we do not have. However, in the o¤-patent market it
is likely that these important variables are not so crucial. Patients potentially substitute brand-
names with generics, which have identical chemical compounds and thus e¤ects and side-e¤ects.
Moreover, innovation and launching incentives are more e¢ciently stimulated through regulation
in the patent period (or more broadly patent regulations) than in the o¤-patent period. The
main intention with RP is to reduce pharmaceutical prices and expenditures (see, e.g., Lopez-
Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). We therefore take a closer look at how the introduction
of RP a¤ects the pharmaceutical expenditures. However, we also look at changes in patients
copayments, which is not a priori evident due to the extra surcharges under RP.
7.1 Pharmaceutical expenditures
Since demand for pharmaceuticals is quite price inelastic, the impact on pharmaceutical expen-
ditures can be measured by looking at the change in average molecule prices, i.e., the sum of
brand-name and generic prices weighted by their market shares (see, for instance, Danzon and
Chao, 2000). Qualitatively, the impact on average molecule prices is evident, since we have
found that RP leads to lower brand-name and generic prices, as well as lower brand-name mar-
ket shares. However, for policy implications it is of interest to quantify the e¤ect. We quantify
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the e¤ect of RP by using the xed e¤ect model specied in (25), where the dependent variable
in the regression is the logarithm of the average price at molecule level. We control for molecule
and time period specic e¤ects, as well as the number of generic and therapeutic competitors.
The results are reported in Table 7 below.36
[ Table 7 about here ]
We see that RP lowers average molecule prices by almost 30 percent. This is a substantial
price reduction, especially taking into account that Norway has a relatively strict price cap
regime, as explained in Section 3. It follows from the above analysis that these cost savings are
explained partly by drug price reductions and partly by an increase in generic market shares.
If demand is highly price inelastic, the volume e¤ects of the price reductions following the
introduction of RP should be negligible. In other words, the overall reduction in pharmaceutical
expenditures should be about 30 percent, which is a substantial cost saving.
To validate this assumption, we test whether there are any changes in the volume trends for
the drugs subject to the policy experiment compared to those not subject to RP. The result of
this is reported in Table 7 above, where we see that there is no signicant volume e¤ect for the
molecules subject to RP. We therefore conclude that the change in average molecule prices is a
good proxy for the net pharmaceutical cost savings of introduction of RP, as claimed by, e.g.,
Danzon and Chao (2000).
7.2 Patient expenditures
RP o¤ers less insurance coverage due to the extra surcharge where patients must pay the full
price di¤erence between the high-priced brand-name and the RP. For given prices (and market
shares), RP simply shifts costs from the payer to the patients. However, the main intention of
RP is to make demand more price elastic and trigger price reductions and substitution towards
generics. We therefore take a closer look at the changes in patients copayments following the
introduction of RP. Unfortunately, we do not observe the patients actual copayments. However,
we can estimate these costs by using our price and volume data.
36These results also survive the robustness checks. The test results are available upon request.
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Under PC regulation there is coinsurance where patients pay 36 percent of the price of the
drug they demand. Under RP patients pay the full price di¤erence between the high-priced
brand name and the RP, in addition to 36 percent of the RP. The RP is the volume-weighted
sum of the brand-name and generic prices for each molecule, which corresponds precisely to
what we dene as the average molecule price.
In stipulating the changes in copayments, we use the means reported in Table 2. Using
the di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, we rst compute the before-after copayments for the drugs
included in the policy experiment. We then adjust these gures by the changes in the copayments
for the drugs in our control group and end up with the net changes of the reform on the patients
copayments, which are reported in Table 8 below.
[ Table 8 about here ]
We see that the price reductions for generics result in a copayment reduction of about 13
percent. More interestingly, the price reductions for brand-names more than o¤set the extra
surcharges due to RP, resulting in almost a 15 percent reduction in brand-name copayments.
However, accounting for price changes that would have occurred in any case, the net reduction
in copayments is about 6 percent for the brand-names. Finally, a substantial fraction of the
consumers switch from brand-names to generics when RP is introduced. Accounting for the
change in market shares, we nd a reduction of about 12 percent in the average copayment.
These gures should be interpreted with some caution for two reasons. First, as mentioned
above, we do not observe the actual copayments by the patients but rely on computations based
on our price and volume data. Second, there are expenditure caps that apply to the coinsurance
part of the copayments, but not the RP part. These caps weaken our results concerning the
e¤ect on patient copayments.
8 Concluding Remarks
From a simple theoretical model of competition between brand-names and their generic coun-
terparts we have shown that endogenous RP reduces brand-name and generic drug prices and
increases generic market shares. We have empirically conrmed these predictions by exploiting
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a unique policy experiment introduced in Norway in 2003, where a subsample of o¤-patent mole-
cules were exposed to RP, while the residual o¤-molecules were still under price cap regulation.
Using a detailed panel data set covering the 24 most selling o¤-patent molecules for the four-year
period 2001-2004, we had variation over time (before and after the reform) and across products
(subject to RP or price cap regulation). The magnitudes of the e¤ects are quite striking, with
the combination of price reductions (for both brand-names and generics) and increased generic
market shares leading to a drop in average molecule prices of close to 30 percent. We nd no
signicant volume e¤ects of RP, which suggest reductions in pharmaceutical expenditures of
about the same amount. Finally, the strength of the price and market share e¤ects seem to
o¤set the extra surcharges due to RP, resulting in lower patient copayments.
By way of conclusion, we would like to identify some aspects of pharmaceutical markets
that should be taken into account when assessing our results and their implications. First,
there might be unintended cross-price e¤ects of RP to non-referenced, therapeutic substitutes,
as shown  theoretically and empirically  by Brekke et al. (2007, 2009). If the therapeutic
substitute is an on-patent product, RP might negatively a¤ect the patent rent by indirectly
inducing lower prices on the on-patent products.37 However, any negative cross-price e¤ects
would be of less concern if the therapeutic substitutes also are o¤-patent, since the innovation
incentives are more e¢ciently taken care of during the patent period rather than after patent
expiration, as discussed in the Introduction.
Second, RP might also induce unintended trade-o¤s between patient health gains and co-
payments (see, e.g., Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). If patients trade o¤ health gains
of drug therapy against copayments, radical changes in copayments induced by RP might lead
some patients to choose a less suitable and/or lower quality drug. This problem is perceived to
be more severe under therapeutic than generic RP. However, Brekke et al. (2007) show, in a
theoretical analysis, that this is not necessarily correct.
Finally, we should stress that e¤ects of regulatory regimes, like PC regulation and RP, on
innovation incentives and health outcomes are two very important issues that deserve to be
examined much more carefully.38 To obtain long-run welfare implications of regulatory regimes,
37 In Germany on-patent drugs were excluded from the RP system in order to limit potential negative e¤ects
on patent rent due to intensied competition caused by RP (see e.g., Danzon and Ketcham, 2004).
38There is a recent theoretical paper by Bardey et al. (2010) on the impact of (therapeutic) reference pricing
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it is not su¢cient only to consider the price and demand (market share) e¤ects, but also analyze
the impact of the regimes on entry (and exit) of (branded and generic) drugs.39 In the current
paper, we ignore e¤ects on drug launching and R&D, implying that we cannot make a strong
recommendation about the desirability of RP versus price cap regulation in a broader sense.
These issues are clearly beyond the scope of the present study, so we leave them for future
research.
Appendix: Estimated e¤ects of RP using a SUR model
[Table A1 about here]
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1Table 1. Sample characteristics, means and standard deviances in parentheses 
ATC-code Average 
brand-name
prices 
Average 
generic
prices 
Brand-name
market 
shares  
Reference 
pricing 
Number
of
generics
Relative
prices 
Number of 
therapeutic 
competitors
Number
of obs. 
A02BC01 10.71 
(2.54) 
8.89 
(1.81) 
75.58
(15.51) 
Yes 1.00 
 (0) 
1.28
(0.09) 
8.21
(0.41) 
38
A10BA02 1.51 
(0.18) 
1.32 
(0.14) 
81.84
(4.72) 
No 3.56  
(0.98) 
1.23
(0.13) 
8.06 
 (0.38) 
48
A10BB01 1.88 
(0.41) 
1.57 
(0.22) 
95.27
(7.81) 
No 1.00  
(0)
1.26 
 (0.11) 
8.05 
 (0.37) 
43
C08CA01 3.14 
(0.62) 
2.62 
(0.57) 
50.39
(15.14) 
Yes 3.80  
(0.77) 
1.35 
 (0.15) 
1.00 
 (0) 
10
C09AA02 2.34 
(0.68) 
2.05 
(0.53) 
73.18
(23.01) 
Yes 4.52 
 (0.85) 
1.54
(0.16) 
2.19
(1.24) 
48
C09AA03 3.42 
(0.77) 
2.56 
(0.45) 
72.42
(22.18) 
Yes 3.19  
(1.32) 
1.54
(0.14) 
2.19
(1.24) 
48
C09BA02 4.45 
(0.47) 
3.44 
(0.39) 
59.58
(11.72) 
No 1.71 
 (0.46) 
1.32
(0.05) 
1.00 
 (0) 
24
C10AA01 5.52 
(1.90) 
4.67 
(1.77) 
58.63
(17.66) 
Yes 3.81 
 (0.74) 
1.28
(0.12) 
3.90 
 (0.29) 
21
C10AA02 9.21 
(0.41) 
7.31 
(0.83) 
61.23
(20.18) 
No 1.00 
 (0) 
1.36 
 (0.15) 
4.00
(0)
17
H02AB02 2.51 
(0.02) 
3.00 
(1.45) 
30.25
(5.78) 
No 1.92  
(0.28) 
0.98
(0.09) 
7.25 
 (0) 
12
J01FA01 13.66 
(0.96) 
7.78 
(0.40) 
75.74
(4.19) 
No 1.00  
(0)
1.76
(0.10) 
0 48 
J01MA02 26.42 
(3.86) 
23.55 
(3.21) 
95.93
(8.28) 
No 1.31 
 (0.47) 
1.18 
 (0.12) 
0 26 
M01AB05 3.49 
(1.92) 
2.52 
(0.12) 
86.25
(4.90) 
No 2.75  
(0.44) 
1.24
(0.75) 
11.33 
 (1.43) 
48
N03AF02 10.61 
(0.20) 
5.48 
(1.48) 
98.74
(1.34) 
No 1.00 
 (0) 
2.06 
 (0.49) 
13.67
(0.48) 
12
N05AH02 15.51 
(0.67) 
13.35 
(0.52) 
73.86
(14.04) 
No 1.00 
 (0) 
1.31
(0.03) 
3.75 
 (1.31) 
48
N05BA12 1.63 
(0.01) 
1.15 
(0.07) 
97.67
(1.01) 
No 1.00 
 (0) 
1.59
(0.10) 
3.00 (0) 17 
N05BE01 14.76 
(0.86) 
11.79 
(0.93) 
59.56
(15.82) 
No 2.33 
 (0.47) 
1.37 
 (0.05) 
3.75
(1.31) 
48
N05CF02 2.76 
(0.13) 
2.11 
(0.19) 
71.99
(13.02) 
No 1.53  
(0.50) 
1.87
(0.21) 
3.00 
 (0) 
32
N06AB03 6.10 
(0.90) 
4.59 
(0.40) 
77.69
(21.37) 
No 1.00 
 (0) 
1.30
(0.16) 
14.39
(0.49) 
36
N06AB04 6.42 
(0.87) 
5.46 
(0.44) 
67.45
(29.89) 
Yes 3.38 
 (1.18) 
1.23
(0.16) 
14.44
(0.50) 
32
N06AB05 6.94 
(0.38) 
5.93 
(0.54) 
69.86 
(27.51) 
No 2.00  
(1.07) 
1.18 
 (0.07) 
14.39
(0.49) 
18
N06AG02 7.35 
(0.09) 
5.45 
(0.29) 
73.77 
 (13.12) 
No 1.22  
(0.42) 
1.41 
 (0.04) 
14.48
(0.50) 
27
R06AE07 2.24 
(0.47) 
1.90 
(0.24) 
53.07
(20.37) 
Yes 4.38  
(1.21) 
1.19
(0.12) 
9.85
(0.78) 
34
R06AX13 2.57 
(0.30) 
2.44 
(0.33) 
76.48
(19.04) 
Yes 3.17 
 (1.91) 
1.13
(0.08) 
11.44
(2.87) 
48
2Table 2. Market shares and average prices before and during the reference pricing period. 
 Drugs subject to 
Reference pricing 
Drugs not subject to 
Reference pricing 
 Before the 
reference
pricing period 
During the 
reference
pricing period 
Before the 
reference
pricing period 
During the 
reference
pricing period 
Brand-name market shares 90.50 (7.02) 50.97 (13.96) 83.06 (16.08) 71.57 (18.58) 
Average brand-name 
prices 
5.07 (3.89) 3.91 (2.78) 8.64 (6.75) 7.91 (6.58) 
Average generic prices 3.92 (2.81) 3.42 (2.31) 6.39 (5.43) 6.40 (5.75) 
Table 3. Estimated effects of reference pricing. Fixed effect models, robust standard errors in 
parentheses.
 (1) 
Average brand-name and 
generic prices 
(2)
Brand-name  
market shares 
Drugs subject to reference pricing -0.2241**
(0.0224) 
-14.6991**
(1.4556)
Brand names subject to reference 
pricing
-0.1113**
(0.0238) 
-
Number of generics 0.0183**
(0.0049) 
-2.3961**
(0.4794) 
Number of therapeutic competitors -0.0256**
(0.0051) 
2.3648**
(0.3612) 
Relative price - -4.9173*
(1.3958)
Constant 1.8430**
(0.0716) 
81.9536**
(4.0629) 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Molecule dummies1 Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1566 783 
Number of ATC groups 24 24 
R-squared 0.559 0.788 
1: In model 1 we include two dummies per molecule, one for brand names and one for generics. 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level.  
3Table 4. Testing for pre-reform differences in price and market share trends. Fixed effect 
results with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) 
Average brand-name and 
generic prices 
(2)
Brand-name  
market shares 
Interaction period 1 0.06 (0.08) 3.26 (3.32) 
Interaction period 2 -0.02 (0.09) 5.05 (4.55) 
Interaction period 3 -0.00 (0.07) 4.03 (3.66) 
Interaction period 4 -0.01 (0.08) 2.11 (3.13) 
Interaction period 5 -0.06 (0.08) 2.09 (2.64) 
Interaction period 6 0.03 (0.05) 3.12 (3.16) 
Interaction period 7 0.02 (0.05) 1.81 (2.55) 
Interaction period 8 0.01 (0.05) 2.47 (2.50) 
Interaction period 9 -0.03 (0.06) 1.27 (2.40) 
Interaction period 10 -0.03 (0.05) 1.61 (2.46) 
Interaction period 11 -0.02 (0.05) 2.40 (3.57) 
Interaction period 12 -0.03 (0.05) 1.87 (3.15) 
Interaction period 13 - - 
Interaction period 14 -0.01 (0.04) 0.18 (3.28) 
Interaction period 15 0.02 (0.04) 6.76 (4.25) 
Interaction period 16 0.03 (0.04) 3.74 (3.30) 
Interaction period 17 0.03 (0.04) 3.56 (2.44) 
Interaction period 18 0.04 (0.04) 1.48 (2.61) 
Interaction period 19 0.07 (0.04) 2.37 (2.84) 
Interaction period 20 0.02 (0.05) 3.41 (2.98) 
Interaction period 21 0.06 (0.04) -0.10 (2.60) 
Interaction period 22 0.04 (0.04) -0.24 (3.05) 
Interaction period 23 0.06 (0.04) 2.76 (3.02) 
Interaction period 24 0.06 (0.04) 3.48 (2.71) 
Interaction period 25 0.04 (0.04) 0.66 (2.82) 
Interaction period 26 0.06 (0.04) 1.73 (3.01) 
Relative prices - -2.061* (0.997) 
Number of generics -0.016* (0.008) -0.733 (0.482) 
Number of therapeutic 
competitors 
-0.008 (0.006) 0.221 (0.295) 
Molecule dummies1 Yes Yes 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Joint insignificance of 
interactions (Prob>F) 
0.608 0.263 
Number of observations 668 334 
Number of products 20 20 
R-squared 0.146 0.366 
1: In model 2 we include two dummies per molecule, one for brand names and one for generics. 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level.  
4Table 5. Fixed effect estimates on average pre and post reform data, robust standard errors in 
parentheses.
 (1) 
Average brand-name and 
generic prices 
(2)
Brand-name  
market shares 
Products subject to reference 
pricing
-0.2132*
(0.1067) 
-13.2200*
(4.9292) 
Brand names subject to reference 
pricing
-0.1207  
(0.1064) 
-
Number of generics 0.0300  
(0.0349) 
-1.1372 
 (3.7974) 
Number of therapeutic competitors -0.0410  
(0.0309) 
3.6675  
(1.9271) 
Relative price - 8.0965  
(15.5232) 
Post reform -0.1649**
(0.0276) 
-15.8138** (3.6191) 
Constant 1.8429**
(0.2690) 
51.1021 
(31.9733) 
Molecule dummies1 Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.741 0.900 
Number of observations 88 44 
Number of ATC groups 24 24 
1: In model 1 we include two dummies per molecule, one for brand names and one for generics. 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 6. Estimated effects of reference pricing. Two-stage least squares (2SLS), 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parenthesis. 
 (1) 
Average brand-name and 
generic prices 
(2)
Brand-name  
market shares 
Products subject to reference 
pricing
-0.1773*
(0.0840) 
-14.2688**
(2.8095) 
Brand names subject to reference 
pricing
-0.1081  
(0.0737) 
-
Number of generics -0.0128  
(0.0473) 
-1.5112   
(0.8417) 
Number of therapeutic competitors -0.0222**
(0.0102) 
2.7643**
(0.8741) 
Relative price - -5.9459*
(2.8350) 
Molecule dummies1 Yes Yes 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
R squared 0.555 0.799 
Overidentification test 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 
0.413 0.524 
Underidentification test: 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic (p-value) 
0.001 0.012 
Weak identification test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic
11.045 52.480 
Number of observations 1404 702 
Number of ATC groups 24 24 
1: In model 1 we include two dummies per molecule, one for brand names and one for generics. 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level. 
5Table 7. Estimated effects of reference pricing on average molecule prices and total volume. 
Fixed effect model, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 Average molecule prices Total volume 
Drugs subject to reference pricing -0.2980**
(0.0241) 
50.2993  
(160.6458) 
Number of generics 0.0076 
(0.0066) 
-27.9792 
(42.3960) 
Number of therapeutic competitors -0.0396**
(0.0073) 
24.2204  
(20.0223) 
Constant 2.1325**
(0.1090) 
602.5053**
(179.8637) 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Molecule dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 783 783 
Number of ATC groups 24 24 
R-squared 0.659 0.159 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level.  
Table 8. Percentage change in copayments before and during the reference pricing period. 
 Drugs subject to 
Reference pricing 
Drugs not subject 
to Reference 
pricing 
Net change 
Generic copayments -12.76 0.16 -12.92 
Brand-name copayments -14.82 -8.45 -6.37 
Average copayments -21.83 -9.42 -12.41 
Table A1. Estimated effects of reference pricing. SUR model, standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) 
Average brand-name 
prices 
(2)
Average generic 
 prices 
Drugs subject to reference 
pricing 
-0.3197
**
(0.0229)
-0.2400
**
(0.0204)
Number of generics 0.0107  
(0.0078)
0.0257
**
(0.0069)
Number of therapeutic 
competitors 
-0.0448
**
(0.0055)
-0.0064
(0.0049)
Relative price - - 
Constant 3.2435
**
(0.0716)
2.4228
**
(0.0636)
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Molecule dummies
1
Yes Yes 
Number of observations 783 783 
Number of ATC groups 24 24 
R-squared 0.979 0.982 
**
: significant at the 1 percent level, 
*
: significant at the 5 percent level.  
6Figures 
Figure 1. Average prices and market shares of drugs subject to reference pricing. All 
substances.
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Figure 2. Average prices and market shares of drugs not subject to reference pricing. All 
substances.
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7Figure A1. Average prices and market shares of drugs subject to reference pricing. Substances 
present in all periods. 
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Figure A2. Average prices and market shares of drugs not subject to reference pricing. 
Substances present in all periods. 
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